The utility of Potential Future Exposure (PFE) for counterparty trading limits is being challenged by new market developments, notably widespread regulatory Initial Margin (using 99% 10-day exposure), and netting of trade and collateral flows. However PFE has pre-existing challenges w.r.t. portfolios/distributions, collateralization, netting set seniority, and overlaps with CVA. We introduce Potential Future Loss (PFL) which combines expected shortfall (ES) and loss given default (LGD) as a replacement for PFE. With two additional variants Adjusted PFL (aPFL) and Protected Adjusted PFL (paPFL) these deal with both new and pre-existing challenges. We provide a theoretical background and numerical examples.
Introduction
The utility of Potential Future Exposure (PFE) for counterparty trading limits is being challenged by new market developments, notably widespread regulatory Initial Margin (BCBS-317, 2015) , and netting of trade and collateral flows (e.g. via SwapAgent ® , LCHSA (2017)). However counterparty trading limits were already difficult to compare from portfolio/distribution effects, and as they were typically changed when a collateral agreement (Collateral Support Annex, or CSA, of the ISDA ®1 ) was put in place. That is, the effects of the change in loss distribution, and any potential change in recovery are included ad hoc. Furthermore, trading limits with the same counterparty but at different seniorities are not fungible. In addition overlaps with credit mitigation and CVA are not typically included in PFE. Thus the typical counterparty limit metric, PFE, as a high quantile (95%, 97.5%, and rarely 99%) of future exposures, needs updating. Therefore we introduce Potential Future Loss (PFL) which combines expected shortfall (ES) and loss given default (LGD). With two additional variants Adjusted PFL (aPFL) and Protected Adjusted PFL (paPFL) these deal with the new and pre-existing challenges. We provide a theoretical background and numerical examples.
PFE is generally defined as:
Definition 1 (PFE(t,q)). Potential Future Exposure at time t in the future for quantile q is PFE(t, q) := CDF −1 (q) max(Π M (t), 0)
where CDF −1 (q)(...) is the inverse Cumulative Distribution Function of (...) for the quantile q, and Π M (t) is the mark to market of the portfolio in the netting set of interest under measure M. The measure M is often chosen as the inverse-T -Forward measure which is defined as the risk-neutral value (which is measure-independent) inverse-discounted by an observed discount curve (which implicitly selects the T -Forward measure). Inverse-discount means divide by the discount factor.
The choice of M is out of scope of this paper, but discussed elsewhere (Kenyon et al., 2015) . illustrates PFE(95%) for a 10Y USD interest rate swap (IRS) as uncollateralized, daily-collateralized, with Schedule-based IM, and then with netting of collateral and trade flows. This is a typical profile resulting from stopping dates every 2W. The spikes in the collateralized profile are a wellknown phenomenon from return of collateral following a trade flow (Andersen et al., 2016) .
Challenges to PFE
Potential Future Exposure (PFE) for a netting set is typically defined as the profile of a high quantile of future exposure for a given margin period of risk (MPOR). The PFE profile runs from now (t = 0) up to the point where there is no further exposure. The PFE profile endpoint may be beyond the maturity of the netting set because of (non-)return of collateral risks. Usual quantiles are 95%, 97.5%, and rarely 99%. In addition the future exposure is generally calculated as loss-on-the-day and not discounted back to t = 0. This makes the profile measure dependent but we will not go into this aspect here.
PFE is used to limit and manage counterparty trading limits with noncollateralized and collateralized counterparties.
We define a challenge to PFE as something that makes its interpretation unclear, incorrect, or meaningless in terms of its objective of being a control for counterparty trading. We first list the challenges and then go into detail.
New challenges to PFE are:
• Widespread regulatory Initial Margin (BCBS-317, 2015) . This is being phased in from 2016-2020.
• Netting of collateral mark-to-market flows and trade termsheet cash flows. A recent example is (LCHSA, 2017) which is going live in 2017.
Existing challenges include:
• Portfolio/distribution effects
• Overlap with credit mitigation and Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA)
• Netting sets with different seniorities
• Collateral

IM
One regulatory IM definition is as a 10-day, one-sided 99% exposure, calibrated to a period of stress. Alternatively, a schedule-based method which uses a lookup table based on notional and maturity can be applied. The schedulebased method makes no allowance for netting so most large traders will use the exposure method. Note that the MPOR is defined as nine business days plus the frequency of collateral calling, so daily calls will give a 10B MPOR. Figure 2 shows the IM challenge to PFE: with IM, PFE is identically zero. This is true even before we consider that IM is defined as the 99th percentile calibrated to a period of stress. In the figure, given a 20% stress, the quantile for PFE would have to be defined as something above 99.86%. Even if this re-definition of PFE was done, using such a high percentile for non-IM or noncollateralized counterparties would be problematic because it would be so high. Thus the numbers that Credit Officers would be required to sanction would be Comparison with 99% quantile given a 10% volatility increase (stress), TOP RIGHT; and a 20% volatility increase (BOTTOM). Given IM defined as 99% 10-day one-sided exposure, PFE is identically zero in all three cases.
completely outside previous experience. The percentiles would also refer to tail eventualities equally outside experience. It may be argued that the collateral eligibility for IM is sufficiently wide to make the IM worthless. However, regulations are written specifically to avoid this situation despite wide eligibility. Collateral value is safeguarded by several mechanisms:
• collateral must be marked to market
• haircuts are required that reference the credit quality, and tenor, of the collateral
• collateral with insufficient quality is not eligible. Quality is defined in terms of 1Y default probabilities, and in terms of the collateral tenor.
• collateral with significant correlation with the posting entity is not permitted
In addition we expect both wide and narrow IM collateral agreements to be signed. That is, some will be cash and (good) government securities only, whereas others will be as wide as regulatorily permissible. At the extreme even if we consider wide-eligible IM to be worthless, the narrow-IM agreements will be valuable and challenge PFE. Despite collateral and regulatory IM there can still be significant, if brief, exposure from spikes in exposure profiles due to return of collateral. This is addressed by another recent market development, covered in the next section.
Netting of Collateral/Settlement and Termsheet flows
With collateralized counterparties spikes in exposure are observed on coupon and principle payment dates when collateral and termsheet flows are not netted. These spikes are from return of collateral following a termsheet payment. Andersen et al. (2016) have pointed out that these spikes may mean that regulatory IM does not reduce exposure by 99%, but perhaps only by 90% in some cases (if for brief periods).
Market services are now appearing that net collateral and termsheet flows, such as SwapAgent ® . With SwapAgent ® spikes in collateralized (or settled) exposure profiles may not be present, but this depends on the exact timing of the default. The timing matters for SwapAgent ® because if a counterparty fails to pay a SwapAgent ® call for two days then it is removed from the service and goes back to the purely bilateral agreements between the original counterparties. On this basis it is likely, but not certain, that there will be no spikes assuming that no flows to SwapAgent ® act as a signal of default of the counterparty. Given collateral and termsheet flow netting, the addition of IM will produce zero exposure below the 99th percentile. This renders PFE(95%), PFE(97.5%), and PFE(99%) of questionable utility for these counterparties.
Portfolio/distribution effects
Here we focus on uncollateralized portfolios and later consider changes of exposure distribution from collateralization.
Since PFE(q) is an exposure quantile it is insensitive to any changes of exposure distribution above q. Thus there can be arbitrary changes in exposure -provided they are 1-in-20 at any time, for q=95%, say. This means that Credit Officers have to factor in these possibilities by hand when setting PFE limits.
Recall that the value distribution of a portfolio is the convolution of the positions with the value distributions of each position. Thus a heavy-tailed value distribution of a single position can be duplicated by a set of light-tailed value distributions. In practice, this means that portfolios will have more unusual heavy-tail distributions than any single instrument (whether or not the underlying dynamics or pricing of individual instruments have heavy tails).
The distribution-insensitivity of PFE is worse than it appears because the tail of the portfolio-dependence of the exposure distribution. That means that a change in the trading pattern of a counterparty can change the exposure above q and this will not show up. This risk-insensitivity of PFE for relatively common (1-in-20 for 95% PFE) events is undesirable. Suppose now that Credit Officers change their q from 95% to 99%. This has two effects: firstly Credit Officers and Relationship manager have to re-calibrate their risk understanding; and secondly the PFE limits have to be increased for all counterparties. Even if this is done, there is now an in-sensitivity to 1-in-100 events: and two or three can be expected each year, per counterparty 2 .
Overlaps with credit mitigation and CVA
If the counterparty is fully credit hedged then there should be no PFE as there is no possibility of loss. A fully credit hedged status is not generally possible with traded instruments from the point of view of capital regulations in Basel III (BCBS-189, 2011) . In Basel III if there is credit protection from a single-name credit default swap (CDS) in place then, effectively, the default probability of the counterparty changes to that of the CDS (protection) provider. Given that PFE assumes default, changes in default probability are not relevant, thus the capital approach may not be relevant. However, the credit protection is relevant but PFE does not typically take it into account because it is not in the netting set that is being protected. A second overlap between CVA and PFE is w.r.t. incurred CVA which Basel III deducts from exposure at default in capital calculations on the grounds that this loss has already gone through PnL (BCBS-237 (2012), Section 2d). Incurred CVA reduces PFE but is not part of the PFE definition. Of course the PFE limit should also be reduced by the incurred CVA because the money has been lost. Thus as a counterparty approaches default the PFE limits will get tighter and tighter as the loss appetite is used up.
Multiple Seniorities
If there are multiple netting sets with the same counterparty at different seniorities then this is a challenge to PFE. Typically there will be separate counterparty trading limits against each netting set. However, the risk is to the counterparty not the netting sets so this is an issue. In addition it is generally not possible, nor desired, to move limit capacity from one netting set to another with a different seniority 1-for-1. This is another practical issue for efficient limit management.
Claim seniority has a major effect on recovery rates. Jankowitsch et al. (2014) have investigated the US market and observe:
Different recovery rates is the main reason that Credit Officers have different appetites for PFE for netting sets at different seniorities. PFE does not take this into account, but the Credit Officers do -hence the limit management inefficiency.
Collateralization
Collateralization has two effects w.r.t. uncollateralized exposure: change in loss distribution; and change in recovery rate. PFE cannot capture either of these effects, and we examine the numerical significance later.
• The exposure distribution changes from a strip of European Call options (uncollateralized) to a strip of Calendar Spread Call options. Figure 3 illustrates the change. In addition, the effect of the distribution changes will be portfolio dependent. • When a collateralized counterparty defaults this is typically because it has debts. Some of these will be via collateralized counterparties. The default mechanism is often that it cannot raise liquidity to pay collateral calls. In short, assets (or financialized assets) pledged as collateral are not available to creditors. Thus we can expect lower recoveries from collateralized counterparties than uncollateralized, all other things being equal.
We defer a detailed impact analysis to the next section where we introduced Potential Future Loss
Potential Future Loss
Given the recent and pre-existing challenges to PFE for counterparty trading limits described above, we now introduce Potential Future Loss (PFL), Adjusted PFL, and Protected Adjusted PFL Potential Future Loss(t,q), PFL(t,q) is the future profile of Expected Shortfall(q) times Loss Given Default, where q is the quantile of interest.
Definition 2 (PFL(t,q)). Potential Future Loss at time t in the future for quantile q is
Notation as for PFE, E M [.] stands for expectation under the measure M, and
LGD(t) is the loss given default at t. The LGD is inside the expectation to take into account wrong/right way risk (WWR). We expect that with the emphasis in FRTB-CVA (BCBS-325, 2015) on WWR modelling this will be widely implemented in that timescale. If we were to assume that portfolio value and LGD were independent then we have : Adjusted Potential Future Loss(Q), aPFL(Q) is the future profile of PFL(Q) with incurred CVA removed, and where the associated limit has had incurred CVA removed.
Protected Adjusted Potential Future Loss(Q), paPFL(Q) is the future profile of aPFL(Q), with associated limit adjustment, where the profile of bought credit protection has been removed from the underlying exposures.
Initial margin, when present, acts as an exposure reduction according to its (with haircut) value. That is, there is no special treatment of initial margins, independent amounts, etc, they are simply part of the calculations.
Given that one credit mitigant is a tradable instrument (single-name CDS), some coordination between Credit Officers and the CVA trading desk is required for effective use of aPFL and paPFL. However, credit protection will typically be purchased exactly where it is needed -and paid for by Sales for the counterparty -so coordination is important. Table 1 provides a comparison of PFE and new PFL-based responses to recent challenges and pre-existing issues for counterparty trading limits. We now look at some numerical examples to illustrate the magnitude of issues affecting PFE (apart from IM which renders PFE void) which PFL addresses.
Recovery Rates
There are no liquid instruments providing market implied recovery rates. CDS provide expected loss, within this recovery and default probability are almost indistinguishable. Even if liquid instrument providing market-implied recovery rates existed, their use would be questionable as exposure, by definition, is unhedged.
Many industry studies exist on sector-wide recovery rates and their variation with market stress (Chen et al., 2014; Jankowitsch et al., 2014) . Senioritydependent recovery rate observations are also available (Jankowitsch et al., 2014) . Beyond this bank Know Your Customer (KYC), Relationship Mangers, and Credit Officers together with internal (real-world) risk models, and market data service providers give inputs to internally computed recovery rates for use in PFL.
Volume Risk Limitation
One concern both with collateralization and with IM is that these may permit such high levels of trading so as to create a volume or concentration risk. Now how big must a position be to create a concentration risk? That is, a position that has a market impact when the surviving party has to close out their positions after the counterparty defaults. The definitions in (ISDA-SIMM-2, 2017) provide one benchmark for concentration risk, and we reproduce the interest rate (IR) concentration thresholds in In practice IM levels were sufficient in the Lehman default and regulatory IM is based on CCP IM. Thus we do not expect increases in volume to create a concentration risk.
Nonetheless, suppose that increases in trading volumes did create a concentration risk. Regulatory IM takes this into account and increases the required IM. Thus there are two feedback mechanisms to limit volume risk. Firstly the existence of IM itself which is costly to provide. Secondly, there is the non-linear increase of IM when concentration thresholds are reached.
Numerical Examples
Exposure distribution effects can be read off Tables 3 and 4 . For a simple LogNormal exposure setup (see below) the ratio of expected shortfall (ES) to the corresponding quantile (i.e. PFE) can be read off the α and β lines for uncollateralized and collateralized portfolios respectively. Just considering PFE(95%) we see that the ES starts at 9% more than PFE at 1Y and goes to 34% more at 10Y for uncollateralized. The collateralized picture is similar. The point is that the ES-to-PFE ratio is not constant, or near-constant, even in a very simple setup whether uncollateralized or collateralized.
To get a feel for the effectiveness of PFL compared with PFE we now look at distribution effects with collateralization. We briefly consider portfolio composition as well. PFE misses all changes in loss distribution above its percentile whereas PFL includes them. Although IM renders PFE largely meaningless there will be a period where IM is not widespread. Even during this period the fact that PFE cannot deal with loss distribution changes above its quantile is significant, and we give numerical indications here.
Normal Distribution
We first consider exposure with a Normal distribution as a limiting case. Suppose exposure follows a Brownian motion with drift, the autocorrelation is
with a margin period of risk m. The volatility of the difference is thus
Taking some example parameters: t = 5, drift=0.01, σ = 0.20, m = 1/26: quantile = 99% Uncollateralized Collateralized Ratio PFE 1.09 0.09 11.9 PFL 1.24 0.10 11.8
For Normally-distributed exposures there is little distribution effect with collateralization (because it remains Normal). Note that this only applies to Normal distributions, a mixture distribution composed of many Normals would not show this behaviour (see also comments on Portfolio composition versus smile effects).
LogNormal Distribution
Many approximations exist to price the spread options produced by collateralization, e.g. (Bjerksund and Stensland, 2014) as well as semi-analytic techniques (Caldana et al., 2016) . For simplicity and clarity we use a Monte Carlo approach. For accuracy we take sufficient samples, and repeats, that the half-width of the 95% confidence interval of the results is smaller than a one unit change of the smallest digit reported. Thus the reported results are exact to the precision displayed with 95% confidence. The numerical setup is as follows
• Exposure is considered to follow Geometric Brownian Motion: drift, r = 1%; annualized volatility {10%, 20%, 40%}; profile forward times {1Y, 2Y, 5Y, 10Y}; margin period of risk {2W, 1M, 3M, 6M}. Not all results are shown.
• Autocorrelation from Geometric Brownian Motion.
• Calculations are done with 2 20 samples repeated 16 times to get the confidence interval. Tables 3 and 4 show quantiles and expected shortfall for Q = 95%, 99% with σ = 20%. PFE misses the change in distribution of exposure and this effect is roughly 20% overlooked for Q = 95% and roughly 10% overlooked for Q = 99%. Relative effects are almost independent of time as they are driven mostly by the margin period of risk. Table 4 : Effect of collateralization on ES/quantile ratio for Q = 99%. Using only the quantile (i.e. PFE) misses the 9% to 10% increase in expected shortfall above the quantile which PFL picks up. For setup see text. Table 5 shows the effects of volatility and time for Q = 95%, whereas Table  7 shows the effect of MPOR and time. Increasing MPOR decreases the distribution effect. Increasing volatility may increase or decrease the distribution effect depending on time. This is because there is a countervailing effect from the increase of correlation with time as the MPOR is relatively smaller with longer times.
Collateralization: portfolio aka smile effects
Theoretically it is difficult to distinguish the effect of smiles versus the effect of portfolio composition because any complex PDF can be created from a set of scaled and shifted LogNormal distributions with different volatilities to within a given tolerance. This is the kernel decomposition of the PDF, which can be rephrased as, for example, creating smiles using mixture distributions (Brigo and Mercurio, 2006) .
The setup is to have two exposure distributions both driven by the same Brownian motion but with different means (one increased by 25%) and volatilities (one decreased by roughly 25%). Table 6 shows the potential effect of portfolio composition w.r.t. collateralization, an increase of roughly half compared to that is missed by PFE.
Example Instruments
10Y USD IRS. The 10Y USD IRS from Figure 1 is displayed in Figure 4 showing the relative expected shortfall(95%) of collateralized (10B) with uncollateralized. The interest rate dynamics use a CIR stochastic volatility Libor Market Model and calibrated to the 5x5 swaption smile as (Green and Kenyon, 2017) . The magnitude of the ratio is consistent with Table 3 and the portfolio effects in Table 6 (an interest rate swap acts as a portfolio of forward contracts).
The ratio with IM is not shown as it is infinity for the majority of the time. PFL gives the residual risk (ES) output but PFE is mostly zero. That is, PFE is simply unusable. Recall that with IM trading volume is largely controlled by the quantity of IM required whilst PFL measures the residual counterparty risk. 
Conclusions
Developing challenges to PFE in terms of widespread IM and netting of collateral and trade flows mean that PFE will become of questionable value (identically zero) as a counterparty trading limit. Outside of widespread IM and netting of collateral and trade flows, pre-existing challenges to PFE (exposure distribution shape, collateralization, multiple seniorities, overlap with CVA) mean that it is already a poor fit for purpose. We propose using expected shortfall and loss given default to arrive at Potential Future Loss (PFL). PFL, together with its adjusted and protected versions (including incurred CVA and credit protection, with effects on limits) are robust against both pre-existing challenges (such as distribution shape, overlap with CVA, collateralization, and multiple seniorities) and developing challenges to PFE.
It is not solely because PFE becomes zero with IM that we need an alternative. PFL provides visibility of what risk remains after IM, but if there was a situation where PFL was zero we would not propose another alternative. This is because PFL is a much more comprehensive measure that PFE, because it looks out to all tail events (above the quantile) and includes them. PFL provides a monitor on what risk remains after IM but it is IM that is doing the essential risk control (by removing risk). We propose PFL also because of the pre-existing challenges to PFE (exposure distribution shape, overlap with CVA and credit mitigation, collateralization, multiple seniorities) that PFL answers.
